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Commentary
Contesting inequality 
While the 1950s and 1960s were a period of increased social inclusion and convergence in 
standards of living for countries of the Global North, inequality has increased and social 
mobility declined dramatically since the early 1980s (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; OECD, 
2008). And while this trend is particularly pronounced in the US and the UK, it is now 
observable in several other countries where the shift in incomes from the bottom and middle 
of the distribution toward the top has been sustained since the 1980s (see figure  1). As Piketty 
and Saez (2003) demonstrate in their research on US trends, the pretax income share of the 
top 1% has returned to levels not observed since predepression times. A more recent analysis 
by Mishel and Bivens (2011) shows that, between 1979 and 2007, inflation-adjusted average 
annual incomes (which in addition to wages and salaries includes interest, dividend, and 
capital incomes) increased by 390% and 224%, respectively, for the top 0.1% and 1% of 
households in the US compared with a meagre 5% increase for the bottom 90% of households. 
In fact, all of the growth for the bottom 90% occurred between 1997 and 2000, followed by 
a period of declining incomes from 2000 and 2007. 
To counter this relative decline in incomes, consumers in the lower and middle income 
groups reacted by reducing their savings and significantly increasing their debt load. This 
led to the build-up of a massive credit bubble that eventually burst in 2007, precipitating the 
world into the Great Recession (Galbraith, 2012; Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). And while this 
recession officially ended in 2009, the economic recovery has been slow: unemployment 
remains high (in the US alone, the economy is still nearly five million jobs below its 
prerecession level), apparent wealth stored in home values was wiped out, and retirement 
incomes reduced substantially. Again, those in the lower and middle income groups, as well 
as certain ethnic groups (see, for instance, Kochlar et al, 2011; McKernan et al, 2013), have 
suffered disproportionately from this protracted slump and the gap between the rich and 
the poor continues to widen. In the US, while the top 1% received 65% of the gain in total 
Figure 1. [In color online.] Top 1% income shares for selected countries, 1970–2010 (source: World 
top income database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/).
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national income between 2002 and 2007, that share jumped to 121% of the additional income 
generated during the recovery from 2009 to 2011. In contrast, the bottom 99% saw their real 
incomes decline by 0.4 percentage points (Piketty and Saez, 2003(1)). Such a trend stands in 
stark contrast to the great compression of incomes that followed the depression of the 1930s 
(Goldin and Margo, 1992; Grusky et al, 2011).
With inequality at historically high levels, the year 2011 saw a number of large-scale 
protests organized across more than 900 cities the world over where hundreds of thousands 
poured into the streets to denounce the continually growing concentration of incomes in the 
hands of a few (Breau, forthcoming; Pickerill and Krinsky, 2012; Sparke, 2013; van Gelder, 
2011). The Occupy Movement, it seemed, was finally giving a voice to inequality. But after 
all the efforts to advocate for a fairer and more equitable distribution of income, little has 
been done about it. By and large, politicians and policy makers have ignored the issue of 
rising inequality. 
In light of the public outcry and overwhelming evidence on the negative social 
consequences of unequal income distributions (more on this below), we find the apparent 
acceptance for the need of austerity measures and reluctance to tackle inequality by political 
leaders puzzling. This commentary is written to summarize some of the recent work on 
inequality that helps us understand the puzzle, reflect on steps required to change the current 
condition, and highlight a number of areas where geographers have contributed to the debate 
(eg, Essletzbichler, 2011) and can make further contributions to contest the existing system 
of unequal income and wealth distribution which we see as a major drag on future economic 
growth and the cause of a large number of social ills. More specifically, we briefly address 
three central issues: What are the causes of rising inequality? Why should we be concerned 
with inequality? And how can we contest it? 
From the outset, we recognize that in writing this commentary we inherently focus 
our discussion on the US and UK developments and debates. This is where the increase in 
inequality has been the most remarkable over the last few decades and where the amount 
of academic research on the topic has been greatest. Yet, such a focus by no means implies 
that the causes and consequences of income inequality, nor the steps required to change the 
current situation, are universal in their applicability. Our closer examination of trends in 
these two countries does, however, have implications for a number of other countries with 
similarly rising inequality (eg, Canada, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Argentina).
What are the causes of inequality? 
Among economists the dominant explanations of rising inequality have focused on 
technological change and globalization. Known as the skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) hypothesis, this argument ultimately blames the exogenous process of technical 
change for rising wage inequality in the Global North as the growing use of machinery and 
computers is seen to have shifted labour demand towards a more highly skilled workforce. 
As a result, wages for the highly educated workers increased relative to those of less-
educated workers (Autor et al, 2003). More recent versions of the argument see globalization 
as accelerating this shift as the relocation of routinized and low-skill production to low-
wage countries puts further pressure on low-skilled workers in the Global North, depressing 
their salaries and thus widening wage inequality between the educated and uneducated 
(see, for instance, Breau and Rigby, 2010). While technological change and globalization 
can account for part of the increase in inequality, those factors alone do not explain the 
sustained concentration of income at the very top of the distribution. There are empirical 
inconsistencies in cross-sectional and time-series analyses that are difficult to reconcile with 
(1) The supplementary tables have been updated to 2011 and are available at Emanueal Saez’s website 
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/). Data reported here are from table 1 of TabFig2011prel.xls. 
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the SBTC hypothesis. Particularly difficult to reconcile with standard economic theory is the 
observation that since the 1980s productivity increases have been decoupled from wage 
increases leading to a declining share of wages on total costs (Fleck et al, 2011). Alternative 
frameworks are thus emerging and these tend to locate institutional changes at the center of 
an explanation. Here, emphasis has been placed on changes in tax regimes, the organization 
of labour, as well as monopolistic economic practices that yield rents seized by corporate 
managers (rather than distributed to labor) and where the legislature is increasingly influenced 
by powerful interest groups such as finance, insurance, resource, and pharmaceutical lobbies. 
While some economists argue that government policy cannot influence the pretax 
wage distribution and hence has little impact on inequality, this perception can be refuted. 
Government has enormous power to affect pretax wages through minimum wage legislation, 
anti-union laws, regulations of corporate governance, rules for financial markets and the 
provision of subsidies to the financial sector, privatization of military operation and health 
care insurance, and the list goes on. In the US, for instance, two key institutional changes 
have clearly impacted the trajectory of inequality over the last few decades. 
The first is union membership, which typically acts as an important counterweight to 
inequality given that wages and benefits are more equal in sectors where unions are present. 
Union membership has steadily declined in the US since the 1950s. Yet neither economic 
necessity nor the desire of workers to obtain union representation can explain the slide in 
union membership. Rather, it appears the slide is the result of a deliberate political strategy 
pushed by well-organized business representative groups and state level legislators who were 
unopposed at the federal level. At a time business groups became increasingly organized, 
workers had little representation in shaping workplace and national politics as the National 
Labor Relations Act placed few limits on increasingly vigorous anti-union activities (Hacker 
and Pierson, 2010, page 59). 
A second important set of regulatory shift concerns deregulation in the financial sector 
where we have witnessed an easing of bank branching rules to facilitate mergers and 
acquisitions, the relaxation of the traditional separation of commercial and investment 
banking, the removal of ceilings on interest rates, and repeal of the separation between finance 
and insurance companies. With deregulation, returns in the financial sectors have soared and 
executive pay has gone through the roof (Philippon and Reshef, 2012). These changes were 
coupled with changes in corporate governance where CEOs and boards received power to 
write their own checks with little supervision by shareholders or ‘investor collectives’ (like 
public pension systems and mutual fund operators). As a result, large swaths of the increase 
in income for the top 1% go to people working in the finance industry (Mishel and Sabadish, 
2012). 
While those two changes affect changes in pretax income distribution, the government 
also redistributes income through tax policy. As the very rich do not receive most of their 
income from wages, they are affected less by payroll but more by corporate, capital gains, 
and estate taxes. Tax rates for nonwage incomes have declined rapidly since the late 1970s, 
such that the average federal tax rate for the ‘super-rich’ (those in the top 0.01 percentile) 
dropped from 75% to less than 30% (Piketty and Saez, 2007). Many CEOs are able to declare 
their extra incomes as capital gains which allows them to lower their income taxes as capital 
gains taxes declined to 15% under the Bush administration. Viewed differently, the reduction 
of capital gains tax equated to a US$30 million gift to each of the top 400 tax payers in 2008 
and lowered overall tax revenue by about US$12 billion (Stiglitz, 2012, page 72). While the 
rich were able to shrug off claims for higher taxation of the top income groups because they 
received a relatively small share of overall income in the past, the numbers above clearly 
show that this is no longer the case. As federal deficits rise it is simply no longer affordable to 
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subsidize the rich. As we will see later, adopting a more progressive tax structure by closing 
various regulatory loopholes in the tax code would go a long way to restarting the economy 
and moving money back to those that earn their living through productive work rather than 
rent seeking. 
The fact that various economic and political processes result in inequality does not 
explain why the large majority negatively affected by rules that harm them do not exert 
more political pressure to criticize and push back against those polices. While part of the 
explanation is rooted in declining representation, we also require a better understanding of 
human psychology, behavior, and discursive strategies employed to justify rules maintaining 
or exacerbating inequality. The first important fact is that people have a poor understanding 
of the level of inequality, believing that the top 20% of the US population holds just about 
60% of total wealth when in fact they hold 85%. They thus (i) underestimate the ability of 
government to do anything about it and (ii) overestimate the costs of doing something about 
it (Gelman, 2010), both while being (iii) unaware that they are actually using government-
funded programs such as Medicare or social security (Mettler, 2010). Cross-country analysis 
suggests that there is an inverse relationship between trends in inequality and perceptions of 
inequality and fairness (Stiglitz, 2012, pages 147–148). While the powerful always attempted 
to shape beliefs, perceptions, and reality, the top 1% now have better knowledge of how to 
shape preferences and beliefs that allow them to implement rules that advance their own 
interests and they have better tools and more resources to achieve their goals. 
Cognitive psychology and behavioral economics help us understand how individuals 
process information about inequality. Information that is consistent with their beliefs is seen 
as relevant, is remembered, and reinforces those beliefs, while information inconsistent with 
prior beliefs is more likely to be forgotten, discounted, and ignored. This is called confirmation 
bias (Oswald and Grosjean, 2004). Another important concept is that of framing: that is, the 
context in which a question is posed. The battle over framing with respect to inequality 
centers on how we see it, how large it is, what the causes are, and how it is justified. CEOs 
convinced themselves and society to believe that their high pay is justified because of their 
larger contribution to society and that it is necessary to reward them for continuing to make 
those contributions with incentive pay. When performance was low, ‘incentive pay’ was 
relabelled ‘retention pay’ to justify high salaries.(2) On the other end, if the problems of the 
poor are portrayed as the result of their laziness or stupidity, then voters are likely to agree 
with reductions in social security expenditures. Media and education are the main weapons 
of control. Media are increasingly controlled by wealthy individuals framing issues in a way 
that suits them, while access to education is increasingly closed to the poor because of high 
access costs. Social distance between the rich and poor impedes the exchange of different 
world views that are shaped by social context. Social distance can result in social isolation 
of one group from another resulting in between-group competition for access to resources 
(Massey, 2007). If social segregation occurs spatially, then those between-group differences 
will become even stronger. Increasing spatial segregation of the rich from the poor is indeed 
occurring in the US and UK, where changes to housing benefits may result in the social 
cleansing of high-cost neighborhoods (Reardon and Bishoff, 2011).
Why should we be concerned with inequality? 
Economics is less concerned with inequality than economic growth. Inequality is considered 
a short-term and transitory evil on the path to higher growth (Kuznets, 1955), a necessary 
trade-off with efficiency gains as inequality provides incentives for the poor to work harder 
(Okun, 1975). Redistribution policies are thus seen as necessarily attenuating incentives. 
Yet the argument that inequality incentivizes people to work harder in order to move up the 
(2) For a critical discussion of the logic for incentive pay see Cohen (1991).
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social ladder is difficult to sustain given that it is the top 1% who write the rules (Dorling, 
2011). Those rules have benefited mainly the wealthy few rather than society as a whole by 
allowing them to extract substantial rents. At the same time, those in power underestimate the 
need for public action to correct market failures and overestimate the importance of financial 
incentives. As a result, they also overestimate the costs and underestimate the benefits of 
progressive taxation (Stiglitz, 2012, page 107).
How so? First, fairness (and the perception of fairness) increases productivity. An unequal 
society is thus perceived as less fair, which reduces the motivation for workers at the bottom 
of the income distribution. Second, the perception of an unfair system undermines trust 
(Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), which in turn increases transaction costs and 
weakens the economy as well as the democratic process. Third, loopholes in the tax system 
allow companies and individuals to park money in tax havens which distort the economy by 
lowering productivity (Palan et al, 2009; Shaxson, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012). As many of the top 
incomes emerge from rents it is possible to establish a more progressive tax system without 
adverse effects on incentives and productivity. This would allow to increase government 
revenues and public investments in health, infrastructure, education, and research, all of 
which are currently under threat following recent tax cuts for the rich that have inflated the 
deficit and national debt. 
Inequality not only reduces motivation and results in lower efficiency, it also reduces 
economic growth and increases economic instability (Galbraith, 2012). If the current econ-
omic crisis is not one of inadequate financial resources of corporations, but of a lack of 
demand that keeps them from investing available capital, then a redistribution of income 
can stimulate demand (Stiglitz, 2012). In the US it is estimated that the top 1% saves 20% 
of their income. Shifting just 5% of that income towards the poor and middle class would 
increase aggregate demand by 1 percentage point directly and with multipliers, up to 1½ to 
2 percentage points. During a recession a reduction of the unemployment rate by the same 
amount can be expected. A broader redistribution would reduce the unemployment rate to 5% 
or 6%. Furthermore, the massive decline in the wage share during the recession amounted to 
more than US$ half a trillion loss in aggregate demand a year, which is much greater than the 
stimulus package passed by Congress (Stiglitz, 2012). 
High inequality also has a detrimental impact on health and crime rates, increasing 
government debt as costs for policing, prisons, mental health services, and hospitals increase 
(Dorling, 2011;Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Recent evidence suggests that our understanding 
of fairness, the need to be treated equally and valued by others, and compassion towards others 
have evolved because they increased within-group social cohesion which was beneficial for 
the well-being of groups and, in turn, individuals making up the group (Hodgson, 2013). As a 
result, we react emotionally to being treated unfairly or undervalued increasing mental illness 
among populations with higher levels of inequality (Mendes et al, 2008; Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009). In the UK, one in six is diagnosed with having depression or chronic anxiety 
disorder and 25% of women and 10% of men require treatment for depression at some points 
in their lives. The wider economic costs of mental illness in England has been estimated at 
£105.2 billion a year including direct cost of services, lost productivity at work, and reduced 
quality of life. It is estimated that the cost to businesses is £26 billion a year, which equates to 
£1000 per employee (http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/NSF/Pages/Mentalhealth.apx). Figures 
for the US are, if anything, worse. These costs are not considered in discussions about the 
costs and benefits of redistribution. 
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Contesting inequality 
We tried to show that the causes of inequality are complex but that the increasingly uneven 
distribution of income to the top 1% is primarily the result of political choices designed 
by and benefitting the super-rich. We also submit that inequality reduces efficiency, social 
welfare, and the standard of living for the vast majority, although we believe that redistribution 
would also benefit the very top. If those two assumptions are correct, then it is possible and 
necessary to contest the unequal distribution of income and wealth. The question is how to 
do that. We think there are a number of steps involved to which geographers can contribute. 
Step 1. In order to implement changes, it is necessary to reframe the debate and this 
requires access to alternative media and education as well as a rewriting of the storyline. It 
is not the ‘welfare queens’ and ‘skivers’ bleeding the system at the expense of the productive 
and ‘deserving’ rich and poor members of society, but the parasitic existence of those at the 
top working in the tax evasion and avoidance services industries that extort government 
funds from bailouts, low interest rates, exploitation of tax loopholes and low corporate 
and capital gains taxes.(3) The recent work of geographers tracking the global fortunes of 
the super-rich is important here (eg, Hay and Muller 2012). Geographers also have a long 
tradition of working on the importance of discourse influencing changes in economic and 
political practices. This work could be extended to highlight more specifically the discursive 
practices that enable the top 1% to pull the wool over the eyes of the majority. It will also 
be necessary to examine the relationship between the framing of a discourse and emotional 
responses, and evaluate the possibility to change engrained habitual responses to existing 
problems impeding the ‘rational’ evaluation of alternative evidence. Geographers’ work on 
affect and habit may help here. 
Step 2. Social context influences beliefs, opinions, and behavior and will inform perceptions 
of economic and social reality as well as policies to change them (Page et al, 2013). If the 
social distance between different groups becomes too large there will be little understanding 
and common ground to develop alternative realities. Spatial segregation exacerbates and 
cements differences. Work by sociologists and geographers on the role of segregation has 
focused primarily on the impact of ethnic segregation, but recent work shows the increasing 
spatial separation by different income classes within and between ethnic groups (Reardon 
and Bischoff, 2011). Examining whether the extent of political fragmentation in metropolitan 
areas shapes perceptions and influences social inequality and social mobility in those places 
would make for an interesting research avenue for geographers.
Step 3. Although confirmatory bias means that empirical evidence is selectively absorbed 
and rejected, we still require more information about the levels and changes in inequality 
at various spatial scales to highlight the growing divides between patterns of inequality in 
urban versus rural regions, within urban hierarchies themselves, and to better understand 
the relationship between spatial and social inequality, the impact of technological change, 
globalization, immigration, as well as economic policies and legal frameworks on inequality 
in different places as they often require locally tailored responses. Recent changes in housing 
benefit distributions in the UK will make it difficult for the poor to remain in rich areas. 
It is assumed that where people live has little impact on the functioning of their families 
and quality of life. But this assumption ignores the importance of locally accessible social 
networks that allow those individuals to arrange childcare, schools, look for and go to work, 
and other daily routines, complex, interwoven individual time geographies that can only work 
in but not out of a particular place. Linking microgeographies to broader social processes has 
a long tradition in geography and could be revived and complemented with recent research 
(3) The Guardian section on welfare offers a number of commentaries on changes in the use of language 
to discredit social security recipients as welfare dependent at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/welfare 
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on the geographies of care, education, and health. We may also want to revisit older debates 
over spatial structure and uneven development (eg, Harvey, 1973; Peet, 1975; Smith, 1979) 
in our pursuit of a better understanding of the origins of inequality.
Step 4. The role of neighborhood effects on social mobility is a long-standing research 
area in sociology and, to some extent, geography. The impact of neighborhoods on individual 
opportunity is linked to spatial differences in the access of resources (including social 
networks) and provision of public services, particularly education, constraining upward 
social mobility for those in poor areas and preventing downward social mobility for those 
in rich areas. Perceived school quality influences house prices resulting in social sorting 
and segregation. While it is useful for schools to exchange best practices there is no need to 
publish results on the supposed differences in the quality of schools if private schools were 
abolished and children had to attend their local schools. Abolishing private sector alternatives 
to publicly provided services more generally would entice the rich to pay higher taxes in 
order to improve services if unable to opt out from them. 
Step 5. An obvious immediate and relatively easy-to-design task to reduce inequality 
and stimulate economic growth is a change in tax code. Recent work by Piketty et al (2013) 
in the US suggests that optimal tax rates for the rich (after closure of tax loopholes) will be 
over 80%. Redistributing those revenues to the poor would stimulate demand and result in 
economic growth. There is plenty for geographers to do here. The ability to evade and avoid 
taxes and how to challenge it requires research in different areas where geographers have 
expertise. First, the fragmentation into different jurisdictional units enables tax arbitrage, 
transfer pricing, the existence of ‘off -shore’ tax havens, and bank secrecy jurisdictions. 
These questions have been addressed by geographers (see, for instance, van Hulten, 2012) 
but could be taken up in the context of fighting inequality. Second, studying the existence 
and role of global tax avoidance centers (previously known as global city research), where 
the super-rich are advised how to leech money from the poor (as it is mainly the rich, not 
the bottom 90% who benefit from those services) has a long tradition in geography (eg, 
Beaverstock et al, 2013). We need more work on those industries to examine how those 
places would be affected by changes in the tax codes. Third, the interregional flow of money 
and wealth would change with changes in the tax code. Places without substantial tax evasion 
industries may benefit (and hence become political advocates of those changes) while others 
lose. Fourth, modelling effects of changes in tax code on the bottom 90% in different regions/
cities would constitute another interesting line of inquiry. 
Step 6. The state is immensely powerful and requires more attention by geographers. 
While the literature on spatial scale has argued that the state is still an important player, the 
emphasis on the rescaling of state spaces reifies the notion that states are no longer dominant 
or potent players in a global economy driven by regional/urban production systems. This is 
problematic. Rules that benefit the rich and harm the poor are very much written at the state 
level and this is where they need to change. The state needs to be reclaimed, not hollowed 
out or circumvented by the bottom 90%. Government-funded research, jobs, services, 
infrastructure, health care, and pensions are necessary and, in many cases, more efficient 
than those provided by the private sector. Analyses of the US defense and medical industries 
reveal higher costs of privately delivered programs relative to those delivered by the state (see 
references listed in Stiglitz, 2012, page 364). While markets have a function to coordinate 
the economy, they do not guarantee that private firms provide better services than public 
sector firms, especially when cost and benefit calculations extend beyond the boundary of the 
firm. Subcontracting usually results in fewer jobs, lower wages, and worse benefits lowering 
aggregate demand and increasing the burden on social security. 
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Figure  2 provides a snapshot of recent publication trends on the topic of inequality 
across major disciplines within the social sciences. Though there is an impressive amount 
of geographic research on inequality carried out already (in 2012 roughly 108 articles on 
the subject appeared in geography journals), in relative terms we tend to lag behind other 
disciplines dedicating a much larger share of their research efforts to questions of inequality. 
There is thus plenty of work to be done here by pulling together different strengths in 
geographical research and applying them systematically to the study of inequality. In this 
commentary we have tried to sketch some of the research areas that map to broader issues 
on the causes and consequences of inequality identified in other fields (such as economics, 
political science, sociology, and psychology) in the hope for geographic research to reach and 
affect a wider audience necessary to change rather than simply explain the current condition.
Sébastien Breau, Department of Geography, McGill University
Jürgen Essletzbichler, Department of Geography, University College London 
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